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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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7 January 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 DECEMBER 1969 - 4 JANUARY 1970

Moscow (3040 items)

Vietnam	(9%)	5%
[U.S. "Atrocities"]	(4%)	2%]
Cuban 11th Anniversary	(--)	5%
Hungarian Foreign Minister in USSR	(--)	4%
Middle East	(4%)	2%

Peking (1949 items)

Domestic Issues	(49%)	42%**
Joint New Year's Editorial	(--)	25%
[Rebroadcasts of Text]	(--)	15%]
[CPR People's Support]	(--)	11%]
Vietnam	(9%)	1%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* Excludes items on Chinese people's support of the joint New Year's editorial.

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VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Vietnamese communist media carry a flurry of year-end reviews on "victories" following the 31 December "special" PLAF command communique* which claims that 1969 was a year of "continuous, accelerated, and persistent offensives" and that allied casualties were higher than in 1968. The communique's claims are echoed in subsequent propaganda, including editorials in Front and DRV media. An article attributed to "Chien Binh" (combatant) in the DRV army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 3d says that President Nixon arrived at his "dribbling troop withdrawal policy" after his scheme of exerting maximum pressure failed completely and he realized the "bankruptcy" of the three conditions he had set for U.S. troop withdrawal. An article in the same paper on the 4th, attributed to "Truc Chien" (hand-to-hand combat), sets out to document the failure of the U.S. clear-and-hold strategy through which "Nixon hoped" to implement his Vietnamization policy.

The year-end propaganda hails the establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Government last June in claiming that 1969 saw important diplomatic and political as well as military victories. The propaganda also points to the NFLSV 10-point solution in this connection, but without mentioning the Paris talks. There are, however, pro forma references to the Paris talks in DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's New Year interview** with TASS' Hanoi correspondent and in PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh's New Year remarks over French television. In the interview as carried by TASS and published in PRAVDA on 1 January, Dong said that the NFLSV's "reasonable" 10-point proposal submitted at Paris had further isolated the United States and the "puppets." According to VNA on the 5th, Mme. Binh reaffirmed Vietnamese communist good faith in seeking a political solution, adding routinely that if the United States persists in "intensifying" the war and "downgrading and sabotaging the Paris conference, the South Vietnamese people will resolutely struggle until they achieve independence and freedom."

Vice President Agnew's visit to South Vietnam prompts the observation from Liberation Radio on the 2d that on New Year's Day he "sneaked into Saigon like a thief." Both Hanoi and the Front recall President Nixon's visit last July.

* The PLAF year-end communique is discussed in the 2 January 1970 FBIS SURVEY, pages 9-10.

** There was also a Pham Van Dong interview last year, published in PRAVDA on 3 January 1969.

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Peking has not mentioned Agnew's trip to South Vietnam, but it has initiated critical comment on his visits to the Philippines and to Taiwan. The only comment on Vietnam in current Peking propaganda comes in the course of omnibus year-end reviews of "imperialist" policy. Thus, a 4 January NCNA item in Chinese reviewing the Nixon Administration says that in an attempt to occupy South Vietnam permanently the President is "vigorously pursuing the so-called de-Americanization and Vietnamization of the war after the war of aggression failed miserably." NCNA on the 7th reports the arrival in Peking of the new DRV ambassador, Ngo Thuyen. VNA announced on 26 November that DRV Ambassador Ngo Minh Loan had left Peking on the 24th.

Moscow sees Vice President Agnew's comments during his trip as further evidence that the United States intends to pursue its "aggression" in South Vietnam. Other comment continues to criticize the Vietnamization policy as a device to continue the war, and a 3 January IZVESTIYA article sees evidence of U.S. intent to prolong the war in the training of Vietnamese military personnel at various bases in the United States as well as in the continued supply of arms aid.

On 5 January Front media release a PRG statement declaring a cease-fire for Tet from 5 to 9 February. Reports on military action highlight alleged allied violations of the Christmas and New Year's truces. LPA announces on 31 December that to mark the holiday, four ARVN soldiers who had been captured by guerrillas were released on the 24th by the People's Revolutionary Committee of Binh Dai district, Ben Tre Province.

LPA announces on the 7th that a war crimes communique, dated 5 January, rounds up "crimes" in the South during the past year. On the 3d VNA had released a communique summing up U.S. "crimes" against both North and South Vietnam during December. It charged the United States with continued bombing of DRV territory in Thanh Hoa and Quang Binh provinces and in the Vinh Linh area.* Other attention to "crimes" includes LPA and VNA publicity for lists of victims of the March 1968 U.S. "massacre" in Son My.

Comment on DRV internal affairs includes the announcement on the 3d that a meeting was held in Hanoi to review the 1969 state plan and inaugurate an emulation movement to overfulfill the 1970 state plan. The 10th anniversary of the promulgation of the DRV constitution is said to have been marked by a "recent" meeting of the Vietnam Lawyers Association at which Politburo member Truong Chinh and Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet spoke.

* Pham Van Dong claimed in his New Year's TASS interview that "some 85" U.S. aircraft have been shot down over North Vietnam since November 1968.

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YEAR-END REVIEWS OF COMMUNIST "VICTORIES"

The alleged communist successes during 1969 which are detailed in the 31 December "special" PLAF command communique are echoed in a flurry of year-end reviews, including editorials in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 1 and 2 January and NHAN DAN on the 2d as well as Front editorials by Liberation Radio and in the English-language SOUTH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE on the 1st. Like the communique, the comment claims that allied losses in both men and materiel were greater in 1969 than in 1968 and that the communists consistently pressed the offensive. Guerrilla successes in 1969 are hailed in a 5 January LPA item which claims that at least 10 "waves of offensives" were launched throughout the South on a regional scale. LPA cites such offensives in Quang Nam-Quang Ngai in May, September, October, and November; on the high plateau in July and November; and in the delta in July, September, November, and December.

Some of the propaganda repeats the PLAF communique's specific claim of 645,000 allied casualties, including 235,000 U.S. and other foreign troops, and notes that this exceeds the alleged 1968 figure of 630,000, including 230,000 U.S. and other foreign troops. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 2d, saying vaguely that the number of "enemy" troops annihilated in 1969 was higher than in the previous year, goes on to observe: "U.S. casualties remained high while puppet casualties increased substantially." The editorial and much of the other comment sees this as a direct blow to the Vietnamization policy. The 1 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial disparages the ARVN in this connection, claiming that although it has "slightly increased in strength," it is undisciplined and has become "increasingly ramshackle organizationally and morally." This editorial also makes one of the rare references to communist casualties, saying that only "light casualties" were suffered.* It declares that "we absolutely are fully able to persevere in the fight until final victory" and claims that 1969 "victories" have "insured a strong and protracted offensive."

ARTICLE BY "CHIEN BINH" The 3 January Chien Binh (combatant) article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the same day, alleges that the 1969 "victories" forced President Nixon to move from "active deescalation from a position of strength to a passive deescalation from a weak position." Citing President Nixon's three conditions for troop withdrawal "from strength"--progress at Paris, scaling down of military action, and ability of the Saigon army to replace U.S. troops--Chien Binh says these calculations were upset by the "great and comprehensive victories of the South Vietnam armed

* A similar contention appeared in a "Chien Binh" article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in October.

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forces and people." He prefaces his recitation of the statistics in the PLAF communique with a statement attributed to REUTERS that "the evolution of the war in 1969 demonstrates that not only were military activities not slowed down,* but the speed of the southern troops' and people's attacks was uninterrupted, accelerated, and sustained."

The "dribbling troop withdrawal policy," according to Chien Binh, was the policy that President Nixon arrived at after his "scheme" of exerting maximum pressure failed completely and he realized the "bitter truth about the bankruptcy of his three conditions for troop withdrawal." The author says the President's embarrassment and confusion were apparent in the postponement in August of a troop withdrawal announcement and his promise, "then forgotten," that he would withdraw troops at a faster rate than former Defense Secretary Clifford's scheme to withdraw 100,000 in 1969. Chien Binh says that the withdrawals--60,000 in 1969 and the promise of another 50,000 by next April--shows on the one hand that the "imperialists" **are stubborn** in continuing the war and, on the other hand, that eventually the United States must admit that its local war strategy is bankrupt and that it has had to "passively deescalate the war from a weak position."

The second installment of the article concentrates on hailing the PLAF and communist achievements, including the formation of the PRG and the establishment of revolutionary administration. Chien Binh claims routinely that even more important than the quantitative development of the PLAF's three categories of troops was the achievement of "higher combat quality through progress in using fighting methods with high combat efficiency." Not only were the main forces not weakened, he says, but on the contrary they received "more training than in any of the previous years" He goes on to cite a 28 December AP item as saying that throughout 1969 "the Viet Cong built up their forces; at present, they are quite capable of conducting the war with even greater intensity."

ARTICLE BY The day after QUAN DOI NHAN DAN carried Chien Binh's
"TRUC CHIEN" article, the paper publishes a discussion of the
 U.S. clear-and-hold strategy attributed to "Truc
Chien" (hand-to-hand combat). This article, broadcast by Hanoi radio
the following day, says President Nixon had hoped through this strategy

* Vietnamese communist propaganda has occasionally directly denied lulls in the fighting. For example, on 14 November a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article said that recent action exposed the "lying propaganda" about a battlefield lull and a record-low U.S. casualty toll.

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to "Vietnamize" the war in order to "deescalate the war from a position of strength." It says that the clear-and-hold strategy is based on the attempt to "preserve" three things--the lives of U.S. servicemen, the "puppet" army and administration, and bases or footholds throughout the country.

Truc Chien deprecates allied progress both in defense in depth and pacification, reviewing alleged failures over the past year to document his case. Posing the question as to whether the Americans can pacify populous rural areas, he says that the number of "unsafe hamlets" remains vast and that "scores of thousands of their wicked pacification agents have been killed* and many others are demoralized." He cites AP as having said on 19 December 1969 that in Quang Nam the Americans "recently sent a battalion to carry out a pacification pilot project in four coastal hamlets, achieving very uncertain results." The article states that the main question in "puppetizing" the war is: when will they be able to shoulder a part of the American burden "so that the Americans will be able to withdraw a significant number of troops from combat?" It also cites AP in saying that in many areas where the Americans "are intensively carrying out Vietnamization the puppets have been annihilated and sustained heavy losses, such as in Tay Nguyen, eastern Nam Bo, Ben Tre, Rach Gia." It concludes that the future of Vietnamization "is very black."

VIETNAMIZATION AND THE GVN ECONOMY

Liberation Radio on 3 and 4 January broadcasts a two-installment article attributed to Commentator which discusses the relationship between the Vietnamization policy and attempts to build up the GVN economy. It says the Vietnamization program is aimed not only at using Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese and at consolidating the "puppet administration," but also at "fully exploiting southern economic resources and turning the southern economy into one providing on-the-spot logistic support" for the U.S. war of "aggression," thus alleviating the American burden.

Commentator notes that there have been "extensive efforts" by the United States to assist the GVN in formulating and accelerating programs such as land reform so as to build a "self-reliant and self-sufficient" economy in South Vietnam. But, he says, "economic realities" in South Vietnam are completely at variance with the American plans. As documentation Commentator cites, among other things, the deficit in the GVN's current budget, rising inflation, a decrease in the value

* The Chien Binh article cited an AP item of 20 December as the source of a report that the communists had killed or captured 25,000 "diehard cruel agents" in 1969.

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of the plaster, the need to import food, and the high food prices; this economy, he says, has produced "increasingly miserable and desperate" living conditions among "every" strata of southerners. In claiming that the GVN economy is not a "national" one but one dependent on U.S. aid for survival, he makes the point that current GVN economic practices and policies now are further exacerbating the "contradictions" between the GVN and the people.

The theme elaborated in the Commentator article is one that has been touched on in past propaganda. For example, a 3 November Liberation Radio commentary on President Thieu's National Day speech accused him of instituting new tax measures in order to obtain funds needed to expand the armed forces and police and to step up pacification so as to "realize the scheme of de-Americanizing the Vietnam war--that is, to prolong the U.S. aggressive war by using Vietnamese to kill Vietnamese and forcing them to shoulder the war expenditure burden in place of Americans."*

VICE PRESIDENT AGNEW'S ASIAN TRIP

HANOI AND Vice President Agnew's trip to Vietnam is noted in a
THE FRONT 2 January Liberation Radio broadcast which says that
on New Year's Day he "sneaked into Saigon like a thief."

The broadcast says that before leaving on the tour of Asian nations Agnew "spent his time listening to reports on the Vietnamization plan," and that therefore one can say he will continue to step it up. Claiming that Thieu, "encouraged by the Americans," has further disclosed his "fascist nature," the broadcast alleges that before Agnew arrived Thieu had ordered "repression of meetings of thousands of students" and had closed "eight Saigon papers accused of neutralist tendencies." A Hanoi broadcast on the 3d says that during his Saigon visit the Vice President, like President Nixon, "boastfully stated" that the GVN had broadened its base. The broadcast cites the NEW YORK TIMES as refuting this claim.

Agnew's trip to the Philippines, as well as his Vietnam visit, is reviewed in a 3 January Front broadcast which recalls the demonstrations in Manila which greeted the Vice President. It describes his trip as "merely aimed at peddling" U.S. "peace" and other programs and at sounding out reactions to President Nixon's Asian policy proclaimed at Guam last summer.

* See the FBIS TRENDS of 5 November 1969, page 12.

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MOSCOW Moscow continues to stress that the main purpose of Vice President Agnew's Asian tour is to explain the President's "Guam doctrine" and to reduce Asian "hostility" to it. Commentators say that in South Vietnam he reaffirmed the policy of continued U.S. intervention and that in Thailand and Taiwan he promised continued military aid to the "puppet" regimes. Reports note that he assured the Thais that U.S. obligations remain in force and that the U.S. presence in Asia will be maintained, and that in Taiwan he confirmed U.S. support for the regime.

Reportage and comment on the Vice President's visit to South Vietnam note briefly that he met with President Thieu and Ambassador Bunker to discuss Vietnamization, but the propaganda highlights his speeches at the military bases. Asserting that Agnew's comments mean the United States intends to continue aggression in South Vietnam, the reports note that he "alleged" that the American people fully support the cause the servicemen are fighting for and that he warned that the troops "should not count on a speedy return to their homeland." A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Asia on 5 January claims that the GIs heard the speech with skepticism; this report, like others, says that a GI whom the Vice President visited in a hospital said he thought he should not be in Vietnam.

ANNOUNCEMENT ON TET CEASE-FIRE

The four-day Tet cease-fire proposed by the communists this year is shorter* than the one in 1969 and announced further in advance of the holiday. The 5 January announcement of the PRG statement stipulates a cease-fire lasting from 0600 on 5 February to 0600 on 9 February. The statement routinely hails the humanitarian policy of the communists and is accompanied, as usual, by a PLAF command order establishing the cease-fire. The PLAF order says RVN and American troops will be allowed to move freely during the cease-fire as long as they are unarmed, move in small groups, and carry no espionage means. It warns, as usual, that all infractions and violations of the cease-fire must be appropriately punished.

ISSUE OF U.S. PRISONERS IN THE DRV

HANOI The only available current DRV attention to the issue of U.S. prisoners is a VNA item on the 7th reporting that the DRV embassy in Moscow had issued a press communique regarding the visit there by an American identified as Henry Fors, who said that

* Last year's truce lasted seven days and was announced on 29 January, approximately two weeks before it went into effect on 15 February.

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his son had taken part in the bombing against North Vietnam. VNA does not make it clear whether the son is now a prisoner, but it concludes that the DRV representative's explanation "helped Mr. Fors see more clearly the crimes committed" by the United States and it adds that Mr. Fors said "he would join the movement to demand and end to the war." The DRV representative's "explanation" was a reiteration of the standard line that the U.S. pilots are given humane treatment and that the question remains unsolved because of the U.S. stand on an overall settlement.

THE USSR AND EAST EUROPE A 31 December Moscow radio domestic service commentary denounces Ross Perot's efforts to deliver gifts to the U.S. prisoners in the DRV as "an attempt to slander" that country, but it does not acknowledge that he had asked the USSR's assistance in delivering the gifts. Refuting U.S. press charges that the DRV does not even give out the names of the American prisoners, the commentator points out that not only does the DRV "not conceal" the names, but even allows the pilots to send Christmas letters to their families. Another version of this commentary, also broadcast in the domestic service on the same day, asserts that the U.S. press "suppressed" a list of 132 names of American airmen given to two members of the Womens' Strike for Peace who visited Hanoi.

The only available communist acknowledgments that U.S. delegate Habib submitted a list of missing military personnel who may be prisoners in the DRV at the 30 December session of the Paris talks come from Prague and Budapest. A 31 December Prague CTK report on the Paris session notes that a list of 1,406 names was submitted, but that Ha Van Lau said the American move was aimed at distracting attention from the main problems of the negotiations. Reports on the Paris session in the Budapest dailies NEPSZABADSAG and MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 31st briefly note that the U.S. delegate, "with the obvious purpose of provocation," submitted a list of personnel who have disappeared in Southeast Asia, "that is, not exclusively on the territory of the DRV."

DRV PRODUCTION EMULATION DRIVE

MEETING ON EMULATION VNA on 3 January reports that a Hanoi meeting on 31 December attended by "leading officials of various branches" reviewed the achievements recorded in 1969 and inaugurated an emulation movement to overfulfill the 1970 state plan. The same VNA item also notes that representatives of the party committees and heads of the various branches, services, departments, offices, and factories in Haiphong also met to review the realization of the 1969 plan and launch an emulation movement to fulfill the 1970 plan.

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According to Hanoi radio's domestic service, Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi in his address at the Hanoi meeting observed that the Politburo and the Council of Ministers had decided to launch a movement of production and work throughout North Vietnam. Noting that it is a broad mobilization aimed at overfulfilling the main tasks under the 1970 state plan, Nghi singled out the boosting of agricultural production and the production of consumer goods. He said that the "achievements and performances which the Hanoi people scored in 1969 have not yet met the requirements in production development and improvement of livelihood in the new situation." And he went on to spell out tasks which must be fulfilled in such areas as industry and agriculture.

Nghi claimed that the emulation movement "not only assumes a major significance towards the rehabilitation and development of the economy, improvement of the people's life, and strengthening of the economic and defense potential, but also bears a very important political and social significance since it will mobilize the entire people" to resolutely fulfill their obligation.

OTHER COMMENT The week before the announcement of the launching of the emulation drive, Hanoi radio broadcast a 26 December NHAN DAN editorial which urged a step-up in labor and production efforts in order to ensure "a good implementation" of the 1970 state plan. The editorial says that the greatest weak points at present are "low social labor efficiency, much wasted labor time, and the adjustment and rational use of the labor forces," which resulted in a low output. It says that due to "inadequate organization and clumsy management, the DRV's great capabilities have not been satisfactorily used, especially labor capability, which has been wasted." The editorial recalls that the 12 December Council of Ministers' communique had insisted that the "greatest importance must be attached to improving state and economic management, and particularly worker management," in order to insure the satisfactory implementation of the 1970 state plan.

A discussion of the realization of the 1969 state plan by Che Viet Tan, member of the State Planning Commission, in the latest issue of the Hanoi English-language weekly VIETNAM COURIER concludes that in the DRV economy "many shortcomings remain and big problems are yet to be solved which require time: The growth rate of production is still low . . . , and there are still weaknesses in economic management." According to VNA on the 1st, Tan said that 1969 saw major efforts of the North Vietnamese in a year of "hard and tireless work to surmount a host of difficulties to fulfill the state plan." He explains that the DRV economy is small-scale and underdeveloped, partly devastated by

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war, and experienced a year of "unstable weather . . . marked by the worst typhoons and floods ever experienced in our history and an unusual heat in summer."

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF DRV CONSTITUTION

The 10th anniversary of the promulgation of the DRV constitution is marked by a NHAN DAN editorial on 3 January, which, according to VNA, "highlights the great achievements in the past 10 years." VNA on the 6th reports that the anniversary was also celebrated by a "recent" meeting of the Vietnam Lawyers Association which was opened by Pham Van Bach, vice-president of the organization, who underscored the importance of the promulgation of the constitution. Politburo member Truong Chinh, addressing the meeting, recalled the "great services" of President Ho Chi Minh, who drafted the first constitution adopted in November 1946, and led the elaboration of the new constitution which was endorsed by the National Assembly on 31 December 1959 and promulgated on 1 January 1960. The NHAN DAN editorial similarly "paid particularly high tribute to the great contribution of President Ho Chi Minh who headed the draft committee," according to the VNA account.

Truong Chinh defined "the characteristics and criteria of a really democratic constitution and pointed to the high merits of the socialist constitution of Vietnam." He stressed that the people "are resolved to materialize President Ho's teachings and make the constitution a sharp weapon to carry out the class struggle and national struggle to build successfully socialism" and win the war. Summing up the work of the meeting, Hoang Quoc Viet, according to VNA, "exposed the fallacious, deceitful, and nefarious character of the so-called constitution of the Saigon puppet administration," and brought out the "superiority of the DRV socialist regime and constitution." The NHAN DAN editorial, quoting from the constitution, stresses that the territory of Vietnam is a "single, indivisible whole from North to South"

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

POLEMICS CLOUD ATMOSPHERE AS KUZNETSOV RETURNS TO TALKS

The atmosphere in Sino-Soviet relations has been clouded by defiant Chinese posturing at the turn of the year as the Peking talks enter what may be a critical stage, with chief Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov back on 2 January after a three-week absence. Peking has taken the occasion of the passing of a decade to ventilate again the bitter ideological conflict with the Soviets, who have responded with their most authoritative rebuke since agreement was reached to hold the talks. While Moscow has sought on the whole to strike a pose of restraint and dignity, it is displaying increasing signs of impatience with Chinese intransigence.

Both Peking and Moscow reported Kuznetsov's return on 2 January. TASS noted without explanation that Kuznetsov was met at the Peking airport by the deputy head of the CPR delegation; NCNA ignored this detail. (On his original arrival Kuznetsov was met by his Chinese counterpart.) Neither side's announcement mentioned the Soviet delegation's deputy head, V. A. Matrosov, the border guards chief, whose departure from Peking with Kuznetsov had been reported by both sides on 14 December. There has been no announcement that the talks have resumed.

PEKING Anti-Soviet attacks in Peking's New Year's Day joint editorial have been echoed in subsequent propaganda bristling with reminders of the ideological struggles of the past decade. As in the editorial, an NCNA review of the 1960's transmitted on 3 January recalls Mao's personal rivalry with Khrushchev and charges the current Kremlin leaders--termed Khrushchev's "successors," in contrast to the editorial's direct attacks on Brezhnev--with practicing "fascist dictatorship at home" and "aggression and expansion abroad."

The theme of war preparedness is underscored in an NCNA report on 1 January rounding up nationwide acclaim for the joint editorial. Propaganda on this theme has been keyed to a slogan--issued originally as one of the National Day slogans last September--which the editorial retroactively incorporated into the canon of Mao "instructions." The NCNA roundup gives this "great mobilization call" a concrete context by citing a "combat hero" who "distinguished himself in the fight in self-defense against the Soviet revisionist armed provocations on Chenpao Island" and who is quoted as holding "the new tsars in contempt." The roundup concludes with a pointed reminder that those "fighting at the antirevisionist frontier posts" in the border regions of Heilungkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang

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are determined to prepare themselves fully against "any war of aggression." Another MCNA report, a 3 January dispatch describing the impact of Mao's "latest instruction" on the PLA, cites still another Chenpao hero whose unit has enhanced its preparations against invasion.

While Peking's year-end rhetorical outpouring has given vent to stridently Maoist and anti-Soviet sentiments, the more conciliatory line in current Chinese policymaking--as exemplified in the Peking talks and the recent renewal of contact with the United States in Warsaw--has also been given authoritative expression in the joint editorial's declaration that the CPR wishes to develop diplomatic relations with all countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Continuing signs of resistance to this line, usually taking the form of allegorical cultural criticism, suggest that the dual strains in Chinese propaganda may reflect disagreement over any relaxation of rigidly intransigent positions. In a recent example, a domestic radio commentary on 24 December denounced a group of films for allegedly slandering people's war. Rejecting "pacifism, defeatism, and surrender," the commentary declared that the Chinese army "is determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield." Raising an issue with significant overtones at the present time, the commentary assailed what it described as the revisionist view that there is a reasonable group within the enemy camp. Typically, the commentary approvingly invoked Chiang Ching, the lodestar of Chinese radicals.

MOSCOW Peking's intensified polemics have drawn a rebuke in PRAVDA, the most authoritative such rejoinder since the two sides agreed to hold talks. An article by Korionov in the 6 January issue interjects into a broad review of the world situation a reference to Chinese military preparations accompanied by "unceasing malicious attacks in the Chinese press against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community." A day earlier, Radio Moscow and IZVESTIYA cited "foreign observers" as noting that the CPR had not reacted to Vice President Agnew's affirmation of unchanging U.S. support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime. RED STAR repeated this observation on 6 January. Previously, apart from PRAVDA's reprint on 19 December of a Bulgarian article attacking Maoism, the Soviet daily central press had carried no critical comment on China since September.

In another sign of Moscow's more polemical approach, an article in the current issue of the weekly LITERARY GAZETTE, reviewed by TASS on 6 January, defends the Russian theatrical innovator Stanislavskiy against a vigorous Chinese campaign that took place several months

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ago. The article assails the "authoritarian" artistic line being followed in the CPR and pronounces the cultural revolution "a tragedy for the Chinese theatrical art."

Moscow uses its purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts in Mandarin to register displeasure at Peking's dual tactics of "clamorously publicizing their efforts to normalize relations between our two countries while continuing the anti-Soviet campaign through the press, radio stations, and slogans." One of Moscow's rare explicit discussions of the border situation appears in a 3 January Peace and Progress broadcast. Recalling that during 1969 "bloody incidents took place along the Soviet-Chinese border--through no fault of the Soviet Union--and that a situation with a potential for serious results developed," the commentary states that "armed provocations on the border will not lead to solution of the dispute with the Soviet Union" and warns that "any attempt to violate the Soviet border will meet with failure." Stressing Soviet willingness to find "constructive ways" to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations and reasserting the now routine claim that it was Soviet initiative which led to the current Peking talks, the broadcast calls for Chinese emulation of the Soviet Government's "principled stand."

Radio Peace and Progress adopted a less admonitory tone in extending New Year's greetings to the Chinese people on 31 December, expressing hope that 1970 will "see improvements in Soviet-Chinese relations and the renewal of friendly cooperation between the peoples of our two countries." Stressing decades of Sino-Soviet friendship, the commentary denies that the deterioration of relations is the fault of the Soviet Union and declares that "all genuine Chinese patriots" share the Soviet people's concern over the development of events. The broadcast comments that "the good will of one side is not sufficient to bring about a harmonious success in the negotiations" in Peking and recalls Brezhnev's 27 October appeal to the Chinese to demonstrate their good will as a prerequisite to solution of the border issues.

The official Radio Moscow continues in its Mandarin broadcasts to rebut alleged attacks by anti-Soviet foreign propagandists on Soviet domestic economic policies and to assail Chinese military policies by implication. For example, a 31 December commentary charges foreign propagandists with attacking Soviet policies in an attempt to cover up the "anti-people" policies in their own country. A 3 January program for the PLA on Soviet defense capabilities asserts that atomic bombs cannot guarantee victory in modern warfare and comments: "But shortsighted adventurists are gambling on nuclear weapons."

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING ASSAILS AGNEW'S TAIWAN VISIT, HITS U.S. POLICIES

Vice President Agnew's Asian tour and Peking's customary year-end reviewing of world events have provided the setting for a spate of Chinese propaganda attacking U.S. policies along standard lines. Peking thus far has mentioned the Vice President's visits only to the Philippines and Taiwan, the former prompting reports playing up hostile demonstrators and the latter evoking attacks on the Vice President's declarations of support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime. According to NCNA on 5 January, the Vice President went to Taiwan in an attempt by the United States to "perpetuate its occupation" of Taiwan and to continue to use the island as "an outpost for aggression" in Asia. NCNA quotes the Vice President as expressing a U.S. intent to honor commitments to the Chiang regime, but it ignores his remarks regarding initiatives toward relaxing tensions with the mainland. The agency claims that the United States has revealed its intention to prevent the Chinese people from "liberating" Taiwan and to remain "stubbornly hostile to the Chinese people."

A low-level article on U.S. foreign policies, carried in the NCNA domestic service's "worker-peasant-soldier battlefield" column on 4 January, takes aim at the Nixon Administration on familiar counts: that the Administration has falsely posed as a peacemaker in an effort to deceive the world; that its new Asian policy represents an effort to find scapegoats in Asia to pull U.S. chestnuts out of the fire; and that the Administration has intensified collusion with "social imperialism." The article seems to be part of a routine effort to keep up the Chinese guard against a traditional enemy. It has not been disseminated in the foreign services of Radio Peking or NCNA.

Other routine propaganda at the turn of the year characteristically plays upon American internal unrest and dissent to draw a picture of massive revolutionary ferment. A review of developments in the United States during the past decade, carried by NCNA on 2 January, gleefully notes that this ferment has increasingly taken the form of "revolutionary violence"--an "important indication of the American people's new awakening in the 1960's." Typically, the Afro-American movement is given pride of place in this account, which adds a Maoist gloss by observing that "some advanced people" in this movement began applying "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" to repudiate black capitalism advocated by the Nixon Administration.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HUSAK NURTURES MODERATE IMAGE, PRESSES PURGE OF LIBERALS

In a lengthy New Year interview published in RUDE PRAVO on 5 January, CPCZ First Secretary Husak sustains his recent posture of holding vengeful ultraconservatives at bay while serving notice that there must be a wholesale purge of liberal dissidents in basic party organizations before another party congress can be held.

As he had done in his 20 December interview following Kadar's visit to Prague, Husak makes it clear that he is having troubles with both the right and the left in his efforts to steer an acceptable course under occupation conditions. While naming "the rightwing" as the prime enemy and rejecting "endless democracy" and "anarchy," he also takes note of pressures from the left in remarking that "certain critical viewpoints are being voiced which I personally, let us say, do not regard as necessarily correct" but which cannot be countered by "thumping on the table" to stop discussion. Today, he declares, "it is not possible for anyone in the leadership of the state to abuse power," as had happened in the Novotny era when "the leadership found itself more or less in the hands of one single man, with very average political qualities." January 1968 was "inevitable,"* but not the ensuing anti-Soviet slanders by rightist forces which continued "up to last April," when Dubcek was dismissed as First Secretary. "The former leadership," Husak adds, "made possible, permitted, and tolerated their inimical activity."

Husak makes it clear that party elections and the next party congress will not be held until the political hue of the party rank and file has been altered. Thus he declares that the annual membership meetings which are usually held at the start of the year "will be delayed by the exchange of membership cards" and that "in my opinion, the elections might be expected after the party congress." He explains that "we want to orient the party on the main political aims before the party congress." Party "elections" are in fact a continuing current phenomenon: the Bratislava PRAVDA on 30 December

* Prague TV, in reporting the interview on the 4th, titled it "Why January Was Necessary," implying that Husak's remarks amounted largely to a defense of the January 1968 liberal takeover; no such title was used by Radio Bratislava or by CTK, both of which carried the text of the interview.

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reported that the leading secretary of the Kosice city party organization, Holeczy, had asked to be released from the post and had "expressed the recommendation of higher party organs" regarding his successor, who was "then unanimously elected."

MOSCOW A fairly long 6 January TASS summary of Husak's interview follows customary Soviet practice in portraying it as a progress report on the fight against rightist elements, omitting Husak's explanation of the reasons for the January 1968 changes and his assurances that injustices will be avoided in combatting liberal elements. Soviet media had totally ignored Husak's 20 December interview with MTI following Kadar's Prague visit, in which the CPCZ leader took a more explicitly middle-of-the-road stance in vowing to resist pressures from both right and left.

Soviet media continue the current practice of featuring articles by Czechoslovak ultraconservatives to mark special occasions. PRAVDA on 2 January carries a New Year article by Jiri Hajek, chief editor of the CPCZ weekly TVORBA, established in September 1969 to replace the liberal POLITIKA which had been suspended in April. The unrelievedly hardline article includes a mild tribute to "the present CPCZ leadership," which has "in the past summer been able to resolutely rebuff the latest attempt of open revolutionary provocation," and reports that "the process of purging the party from top to bottom of its opportunist elements is underway at present." In connection with this year's 25th liberation anniversary, Hajek adds, the youth especially must be told that "the soldiers of the land of the Soviets and the Soviet people brought us freedom, state independence, and happiness." Hajek goes to unprecedented lengths in charging that the raising of "the so-called 'Czechoslovak question'" at the June 1969 international party conference in Moscow resulted from a plot by "revisionist renegades" to "blow up this conference."

Typical of Moscow's own comment around the turn of the year is a 27 December KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article by the paper's Prague correspondent presenting a mixed picture of progress toward "normalization" in the occupied country. While approving the "gradually" developing "unity" and "integration" of the workers and youth, respectively, the correspondent deplores the open display of a brochure entitled "Lenin in Czechoslovakia" which allegedly underplays Lenin's drive against "opportunists." He adds that "such a Lenin, angry and boldly going to the offensive, is also feared by opportunists today."

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ALBANIA

YOUTH LEADERS' SUICIDES PROMPT DISTRICT PARTY PURGE

Recent indications that the Hoxha regime's efforts to "revolutionize" Albanian society and to create a "new Albanian man" are meeting resistance and that the party is cracking down on "conservative" elements are reinforced by a 20 December ZERI I POPULLIT article which reports for the first time that two Tepelene communist youth leaders committed suicide on an unspecified date in 1969 and divulges that the district party leadership was purged as a result. According to the article, the two youths had been wrongfully condemned by the district party committee bureau as "traitors and enemies of the party and people." The article does not spell out the nature of the "slanders" against the youths in detail, but it praises them as "vanguard militants" and makes clear that their attempts to fight for the party's line on the emancipation of women and youth were what aroused opposition from "the class enemy."

Emphasizing the seriousness with which the regime views the incident, the paper reports that the party Central Committee met on an unspecified date to discuss the matter and "gravely denounced the mistaken attitude of the Tepelene district's leading members." It adds that the party Secretariat also met and that Hoxha delivered a programmatic speech on 18 October entitled "The Rights and Freedoms of Women and Youth Should Be Deeply Understood and Protected By All."

Hoxha's speech got no publicity at the time it was delivered and still has not been released in full, but a belated report of its contents in ZERI I POPULLIT on 14 December appears in retrospect to have been intended as a prelude to the disclosure a week later of the suicides and the ensuing shakeup in the Tepelene district. The suicides evidently took place some time in the summer or early fall. In what may be read now as pointed allusions to the Tepelene affair, the 14 December report said Hoxha's October speech raised problems of "deepening socialist democracy and ensuring the rights of women and youth," warned against "gossip, slander, and conservatism," and acknowledged that "the class struggle" is taking place "within the party ranks." The report described the speech as a whole as concerned with "the struggle for the revolutionization of every aspect of the country's life" and said it was being studied at every organizational level.

Following the October meeting of the Secretariat and Hoxha's address, the 20 December article reports, a plenum of the Tepelene district "rehabilitated" the deceased youths and "dismissed" three district

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party secretaries from their posts. The plenum, it adds, also took "punitive measures against other comrades who committed mistakes, and the principal slanderer was publicly tried and was given the heaviest possible sentence as a slanderer."

The disclosure of the Tepelene incident suggests that the regime hopes to use it to justify an intensification of the present phase of the ideological-political revolutionization campaign. (Albania instituted its mini-version of a cultural revolution in February 1967, designed to "emancipate" youth and women and to abolish all religious institutions and bourgeois vestiges). Thus the article emphasizes that party cadres should "draw lessons" from the incident and implies that any future evidences of "negative phenomena," "alien concepts," and "conservatism" will be dealt with severely. The article concludes that the incident underscores a need "to strengthen the party's political-ideological and organizational work and the further education of the masses." All basic and mass organizations as well as working centers and agricultural cooperatives, it adds, have already "begun an analysis of the state of their affairs in the light of Comrade Hoxha's speech, and a sound spirit of self-criticism is being observed everywhere."

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